revisions he made in response to his model's rather dramatic failure to forecast Clinton's election in 1992.
1 My aim here is to report one political scientist's reactions to Fair's work, and in the process to introduce economists to some unresolved issues in the broader political science literature on economics and elections.
One of the most interesting aspects of Fair's essay is the unusually frank and detailed description it provides of the enormous amount of exploratory research underlying published Leamer (1978) has referred to as "specification uncertainty" plagues this (or any other) statistical analysis of presidential election outcomes.
One practical implication of this specification uncertainty is neatly illustrated in Fair's Table 4 , which provides seven different forecasts of the 1996 election outcome based on different data sets and model specifications, ranging from a narrow Dole victory to a Clinton landslide of near-historic proportions. To his credit, Fair forthrightly settles on one of these seven forecasts as his "'final' choice." Alas, as it happens, this one turns out to be the only one of the seven to get the election outcome wrong. Moreover, it is not a narrow miss in a close election, but a substantial error of more than 5 percentage points, well out in the tail of the forecast error distribution implied by Fair's reported standard error of 1.9 percentage points, or by his reported mean absolute error of 2.1 percentage points for "out-of-sample" forecasts based on applying his 1916-1960 parameter estimates to post-1960 elections.
2
How is it that Fair managed to go so far wrong once again --in a relatively tranquil election that most other analysts got right?
What is most striking in Fair's account is that, in almost every case, his choice of model specification seems to have been guided by goodness-of-fit considerations rather than by a priori political or economic considerations. His data set begins in 1916 because "some experimentation . . . using observations prior to 1916" produced results that "were not as good."
Gerald Ford is sometimes counted as an incumbent and sometimes not, depending upon which treatment "improves the fit of the equation." Revised economic data produced significant changes in several key coefficients, prompting renewed searching "to see which set of economic variables led to the best fit," and so on.
Of course, a priori political and economic considerations cannot neatly resolve all the specific questions facing data analysts in this (or any other) field. But they can suggest sensible directions and constraints. Certainly no sane political scientist would ever have estimated a constant partisan trend from 1916 through 1976, whether or not the resulting coefficient had a "significant" t-statistic. Now the partisan trend is gone, but Bush's surprising defeat in 1992 has inspired a new economic variable with a similarly dubious theoretical rationale: the number of quarters in which the growth rate is greater than 2.9 percent. (Why 2.9 percent? Of course, because that value "gave the best fit.") Fair acknowledges, with charming understatement, that "Data mining is a potentially serious problem in the present context, given the small number of observations." Indeed it is! Given his apparent willingness to follow every jot and wiggle in the meager historical record, it is hardly surprising that Fair's model has been subject to so many nasty surprises and significant revisions --or if his account of the process of data analysis brings to mind the title and moral of Leamer's (1983) plea, "Let's Take the Con out of Econometrics."
It may be worth noting in passing that a simple average of Fair's seven forecasts nicely matches the actual 1996 election outcome. Of course, a simple average is too simple; but it is not hard to imagine more sophisticated ways, including some at least approximately true to the spirit of Leamer's critique, of averaging the forecasts implied by these (and many other)
alternative models of the presidential vote --and of allowing for the uncertainty implied by the differences among them. 3 In the meantime, it is certainly worth bearing in mind the lesson Beck (1994) drew from his own review of Fair's and other election forecasting models: "We Should Be Modest."
At the same time, we should be clearer about what election forecasting models are for. If the point is literally to predict the outcome of an election in advance, one can certainly do better using current survey data in combination with economic variables rather than either one alone.
(All of the models that did well in 1992 and 1996 included political variables omitted from Fair's models, and those that did best in the sense of forecast accuracy included political variables closely related to the actual vote, such as presidential approval ratings or election trial heats, as measured in contemporary surveys.)
Moreover, if what we really care about is who will be president, we should be forecasting Despite a good deal of uncertainty regarding the exact form of the relationship, the relevant time horizon, and the relative importance of specific economic indicators, there can be no doubt that presidential elections are, in significant part, referenda on the state of the economy.
Most of the available evidence suggests that voters weigh recent changes in economic conditions more than temporally distant changes --and more than absolute levels of economic well-being. It also suggests, though rather less clearly, that changes in disposable income matter more than changes in GDP (which are presumably less tangible), which in turn matter more than changes in unemployment (which produce relatively few direct losers) and inflation (which produce many losers but also a good many winners). However, we know much less about the policy implications of these facts, including the extent to which elected politicians actually succumb to the temptation to adopt what Tufte (1978) referred to as "myopic policies for myopic voters." Do economic conditions matter because people vote their own pocketbooks, or because they respond to changes in the whole nation's economic condition? The work of Markus (1988) and others has demonstrated that personal and national economic fortunes are both important.
However, this demonstration does almost nothing to resolve the related question of whether Can voters untangle the complex contributions of the president and other actors to the making of government policy? Can they untangle the even more complex contributions of government policy, exogenous economic forces, and dumb luck to observed levels of economic growth, wage changes, unemployment, or inflation? Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal (1993) attempted to distinguish between "rational" and "naive" economic voting by estimating separate electoral effects for economic "shocks" and economic growth that was "predictable" on the basis of previous growth, partisan effects, and military mobilization. They found no significant difference between these potentially distinct effects, a result they interpreted (1993, 23) as "consistent with the hypothesis of naive retrospective voting." Nevertheless, much work remains to be done in investigating the average voter's grasp of how the political economy actually operates.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we know remarkably little about why voters reward the incumbent president for prosperity or punish him for economic distress. Do they have any rational basis for supposing that economic conditions in the election year are indicative of future conditions if the incumbent is reelected? (As far as I know, nobody has demonstrated such a connection.) Do they know or care what, if anything, the out party would do differently? Or, as Ferejohn (1986) and others would have it, are they simply holding up their end of a simpleminded implicit contract intended to extract whatever effort a self-interested incumbent may be able to exert on their behalf --the only sort of accountability feasible in a situation marked by massive uncertainty and asymmetric information?
Fair's own evaluation of his latest model is that "It may be . . . better at explaining the past than the future. Time will tell. If the equation predicts the next two or three elections within two or three percentage points, there may be something to it. Otherwise, I will have to keep searching or do something else in my updating week every four years." By that standard, it is indeed time for a change of course. However, my own hope is that Fair will apply his considerable expertise not to additional searching for elusive forecasting magic, or to a different hobby altogether, but to joining in a broader assault on the many significant questions that remain unanswered in the scholarly literature on economics and elections.
